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Abstract: This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the 
tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not 
immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater 
(or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At 
the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government 
provokes an “income effect” which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. 
Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an 
electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according 
to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent.   
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1. Introduction 
 
There is no consensus in the relatively scarce literature on public finance and tax 
administration about how the objective function of a tax administration should be 
characterised (see Shoup, 1969; or, for a recent review, Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). The 
most common approach considers it to be a public agency which attempts to maximise the 
amount of gross tax revenue collected1. However, some empirical papers have shown that 
the efforts made by a tax administration are also guided by electoral concerns (Hunter and 
Nelson, 1995; or, more recently, Young et al., 2001) and, in the case of the sub-central tax 
administrations, conditioned by the system of unconditional grants (Jha et al., 1999; Baretti 
et al., 2002). This paper aims to test several hypotheses concerning the political 
determinants of the activities of the regional tax administration in Spain, in contrast to 
previous papers which have only tested one connection at a time.  
 
First, we check whether there is a link between the tax administration and the public 
budget, or whether the tax administration is simply a “black box” that - irrespective of the 
“health” of public finances, which are under the direct control of politicians (i.e., the 
Finance Ministry) - aims to obtain as much tax revenue as possible from taxpayers2. Thus, 
for instance, we test whether the tax administration exerts a greater effort in collecting 
taxes when the (expected) public deficit is greater, and vice versa. Second, we analyse 
whether those efforts depend on the political strength of government in the regional 
parliament and electoral competitiveness in each electoral district (or province). According 
                                                          
1 According to Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987), this rule – which in equilibrium implies equality 
between marginal cost and marginal benefit - will not be optimal, as while the former is a real cost, 
the latter is simply a transfer from the taxpayer to the tax administration. That objective function 
would only be optimal as long as the tax administration operates given a level of inputs (Andreoni 
et al., 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). 
 
2 In this sense, the spirit of the present analysis is also very close to Toma and Toma’s (1986) 
framework, in which "... the tax rates [emerge]... as a consequence of competition among political 
actors in the legislative arena. Once this structure has been established, a separate government 
body, the treasury, will devote resources toward the collection of revenue. The question of 
relevance then becomes how treasury bureaucrats will vary their collection activity in response to 
changes in the legislative determined tax rate" (pp. 141-142). However, there are two differences 
between the present approach and that of Toma and Toma (1986): firstly, in their paper the reaction 
is only caused by the variation in statutory tax parameters, while we consider any source of 
budgetary shock (e.g., an increase in the cost or the demand of provision of public goods); and 
secondly, in Toma and Toma (1986) the influence of politicians on bureaucrats is only due to an 
appropriation process by the latter, while we do not make explicit the source of connection between 
these two actors. 
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to this hypothesis of “electoral competition”, we would expect to see less effort in those 
electoral districts where the margin for winning or losing a parliamentary seat is smaller, 
although a priori such an incentive should be less important the greater the parliamentary 
strength of the incumbent (e.g., measured through her percentage of seats in the regional 
parliament)3.  
 
The empirical validation of either of these two hypotheses would confirm the connection 
between the tax administration and the political power, though each one of them embodies 
totally different normative implications. In the first case, the tax administration becomes an 
extra tax instrument - apart from statutory tax parameters - for the government, and is used 
in order to obtain additional tax revenues (and so meet the constituency expenditure 
needs); therefore, it must increase the overall efficiency of the tax system (Slemrod, 1990). 
In the second case, however, there would be less overall efficiency (and inter-provincial 
equity) since the efforts of the tax administration are simply guided by electoral motives.    
 
These hypotheses are tested through an empirical analysis based on the estimation of 
stochastic frontiers (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), and a 
frontier function is obtained from the estimation of a tax revenue function. The fact that 
certain observations lie below the frontier may be due either to an estimation error or to 
inefficiency on the part of the tax administration (i.e., less effort in tax collection). This 
technique disentangles both effects. Thus, we aim to identify which factors explain the 
distance of each decision unit to the frontier (what is known as the inefficiency effects 
model) by applying the methodology developed by Battese and Coelli (1995) to a panel of 
                                                          
3 Among other studies that have tested the importance of the marginal “electoral productivity” by 
district in the design of public policies, see Wallis (1996), for the distribution of federal grants to 
the US states; Case (2001), who tests the political criteria that guide the allocation of block grants 
from federal to sub-federal layers of government in Albania; Castells and Solé-Ollé (2002), for the 
allocation of national investment across Spanish regions; Garrett and Sobel (2002), who test the 
presidential influence on the rate of disaster declaration and the allocation of emergency funds 
across US states; Besley and Burgess (2002), Besley and Case (2002), or Besley and Preston 
(2002), all of whom show that the responsiveness of government is greater the greater the electoral 
competition;  or Young et al. (2001) - already cited in the main text – who test whether the tax 
audit probability by district depends on the electoral importance of that district to the president. 
Certainly, all these studies show the importance of electoral motives for the design of public 
policies, though the measurement of “electoral competition” differs in each case according to the 
way in which regional representatives are elected to the national assembly. This has to be 
appropriately dealt with in our analysis, given the multi-party system prevailing in Spain (unlike 
the US system, where most of the cited studies have been applied) and the functioning of the 
d’Hondt formula to transform the votes obtained in a district into seats in the regional parliament. 
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data. This methodology has already been used in another paper to study the behaviour of 
the tax administration (Jha et al., 1999). 
 
The empirical analysis is based on the behaviour of the Spanish tax administration at the 
regional level (in Spanish, Comunidades Autónomas, CA’s). However, in order to enlarge 
the database, each province (or in political terminology, electoral district) of a CA is 
considered as a decision unit in the analysis. In Spain, the CA’s have the power to 
administer certain taxes ceded by central government at the beginning of the 1980’s, while 
their right to vary their statutory tax parameters has been null, at least prior to 1997. This 
institutional framework seems especially suitable for the analysis of the hypothesis of 
"electoral competition", since given the null fiscal responsibility in setting statutory tax 
parameters by regional governments, we expect a greater importance of this hypothesis 
than in the US case - which has been the case analysed in the papers previously cited - 
where state governments can also react by modifying statutory tax parameters. Moreover, 
the importance of the unconditional grants in regional budgets enables us to test the extent 
to which their relative importance influences efficiency in tax administration (in our case, 
exclusively through an “income effect”), as Jha et al. (1999) and Baretti et al. (2002) have 
shown for India and Germany, respectively.  
 
The results obtained suggest a close connection between the political power and the tax 
administration. Firstly, it was found that the level of efficiency (i.e., the effort in collecting 
taxes) tends to be greater the greater the level of (expected) public deficit. However, if the 
level of unconditional grants from central government is high enough (approximately 41% 
with respect to public expenditure, which is above the average during the period of 
analysis), efficiency diminishes. Secondly, the tax administration is also guided by 
electoral concerns, since it tends to decrease its level of efficiency in a district (with the 
aim of increasing the level of popularity of the incumbent) when the margin for losing a 
parliamentary seat in that district is narrow, while this decrease is lower the higher the 
political strength of the incumbent in the regional parliament. Thus, there is an interesting 
asymmetric impact of electoral concerns on tax administration, since “electoral 
competition” only becomes an important factor with respect to the possibility of losing a 
parliamentary seat, and not with respect to the possibility of winning an additional one. All 
these results are quite robust to different specifications of the empirical model, as will be 
shown.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we set up the basic 
hypotheses concerning the empirical analysis, firstly, with respect to the tax revenue 
function and then with respect to the determinants of effort in tax administration. In the 
third section, we describe the empirical methodology and the database constructed for the 
analysis. Section four presents the results of the empirical estimation, while section five 
contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Characterisation of the process of collecting tax revenue 
 
2.1. The tax revenue technology 
 
In this section we will define the “tax technology”, as this enables the motives which guide 
the efforts of the tax administration to be identified. The tax technology - which will later 
be estimated in the empirical analysis - is a function that translates the inputs of the tax 
administration (basically, number of tax inspectors and general staff, on the one hand, and 
stock of capital, on the other), I, the (marginal) statutory tax rate, t, and the tax capacity, B, 
into the tax revenue collected, T (Mayshar, 1991). However, given the value of these 
variables, not all potential revenue will presumably be collected, given the presence of tax 
avoidance and/or evasion4, S, such that 01 ≥≥ S . Therefore, the tax technology is a 
function T(I,t,B,S). The main differences from the function originally proposed by Mayshar 
are that we have distinguished between the inputs of the tax administration and the 
statutory tax rate, while he includes both factors into just one variable, θ . Furthermore, 
Mayshar calls S “tax-shielding activity”, though he himself shows that it can also be 
interpreted as the level of tax evasion (Mayshar, 1991, fn. 5).  
 
The literature has identified several factors which might explain tax evasion. Following  
Andreoni et al. (1998), these can be classified into three main groups: (i) income and tax 
rates; (ii) demographic and social factors; and (iii) penalties and audit probabilities. 
However, the expected sign of each one of these variables is not clear-cut, since the results 
of the theoretical and empirical models do not always coincide (see Andreoni et al., 1998, 
pp. 838-47, for a detailed discussion of these issues). The classical theoretical models of 
tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) predict that the greater the audit probability, 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) for a definition of each of these two concepts, though they 
both have the same consequence: a reduction in the amount of tax revenue collected. 
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the lower the level of tax evasion, which will also happen in the case of a greater penalty. 
The same result is obtained with respect to income as long as the taxpayer exhibits 
decreasing risk aversion with respect to income. Finally, the effect of an increase in the 
(marginal) tax rate is not obvious, since it depends on an “income effect” (in favour of less 
tax evasion) and on a “substitution effect” (that promotes more tax evasion). However, if 
the penalty is proportional to the amount of tax evaded, the “substitution effect” 
disappears, and so an increase in t always promotes more tax compliance (Yitzhaki, 1974). 
Due to the multiplicity of factors which might exert some influence on the decision to 
evade taxes, some empirical (and experimental) analyses have also included socio-
economic variables such as the level of education, age, race or occupation of the taxpayer 
(see Andreoni et al., 1998, pp. 840-1).  
 
According to the traditional analysis, the level of tax evasion can therefore be expressed as 
follows:  
 
    -   -  -             
)F ,p ,t ,Y(SS
+
=                                       [1] 
 
where Y is the level of income, p is the audit probability, and F is the penalty proportional 
to the amount of evaded tax. Indicated below each variable in [1] is the expected sign of 
the relationship of that variable with respect to S according to the traditional analysis. 
Among the variables included in [1], p is the only one that will be at the disposal of the tax 
administration, since t and F are established by law5, while the other variables are 
exogenous. Finally, note that S could be interpreted more broadly. For example, it could be 
that S<1 merely because the tax administration has not carried out a proper assessment of 
the tax bases, which is very important in the case of wealth taxation (the main tax base in 
our empirical analysis), or simply because it has not administered diligently enough the tax 
returns submitted by taxpayers, which would cause a delay in payment (and so de facto a 
reduction in the present value of the tax base). Thus, once S is defined in a broader way, 
other instruments at the disposal of the tax administration - apart from p – should also be 
included in [1]. All these instruments - including p - are summarized into a single variable, 
                                                          
5 Although in certain institutional contexts there might be certain discretionary power on the part of 
the tax administration in order to negotiate with the tax evader the effective penalty. See, for 
example, OCDE (1990), Table 11, pp. 57-59. 
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E, which from now on will refer to the efforts of the tax administration in reducing S. 
 
If we insert expression [1] into the function T, and given the definition of E, we get:  
 
T=T(I, t ,B, S(Y ,t ,E, F))                       [2] 
 
Defined in this way, the tax technology shows a third difference with respect to the original 
model of Mayshar (1991). In his model, he does not explicitly differentiate between I and 
the variables at the disposal of the tax administration, E. However, in the present paper 
such a difference is crucial to understanding the empirical framework used, and becomes 
clear if we suppose that the problem of collecting tax revenue consists of two steps (see 
Andreoni et al., 1998, pp. 826-827): 
 
1st. A social planner chooses all relevant policy parameters (including the statutory tax 
rate) and the technical means at the disposal of the tax administration (which include the 
number of personnel and the stock of capital). Hence, the social planner has chosen t and I, 
but also F (see fn. 5). 
 
2nd. The tax administration is delegated the responsibility of enforcing the tax obligations 
of taxpayers through a diligent administration of tax returns, the realisation of tax audits or 
the proper assessment of tax bases, among other tasks. Thus, the tax administration, given 
the budget at its disposal, the statutory tax parameters and F, chooses E. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the main aim of this paper is to find the variables that 
explain the behaviour of the tax administration, i.e., those variables that guide the selection 
of E6. According to the empirical methodology - which is explained in detail in section 3.1. 
- both T and S will (consistently) be estimated. Thus, given the supposedly positive 
relationship between S and E (e.g., a greater p), and bearing in mind the other variables 
included in [1], then as long as a positive relationship between the potentially explanatory 
variables of E and S is found we will have indirectly shown the influence of the former 
                                                          
6 Note that our approach not only enables the audit probability, p, to be explained, as other papers 
have done (Hunter and Nelson, 1995; Young et al., 2001), but all the efforts made by the tax 
administration in collecting tax revenue – including p - through the definition of E. 
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group of variables on the choice of E7. That is why it is crucial for our empirical analysis to 
set up certain basic hypotheses concerning the choice of E. 
 
2.2. The determinants of efforts in tax administration 
 
All the variables identified as potentially explanatory of E are qualified as political in the 
sense that: (i) they are connected with the “health” or composition of the public budget 
(from now on, budget connection), the responsibility for which falls on a political actor; or 
(ii) the tax administration is used in order to gain electoral popularity by the incumbent 
(electoral competition); or finally, (iii) the government exerts its influence on the tax 
administration in order to impose its partisan preferences on the effort put into tax 
collection (partisan preferences).  
 
The hypotheses concerning each one of these three groups of factors that could potentially 
affect the choice of E are as follows: 
 
(i) Budget connection. In the empirical analysis, two different hypotheses with respect to 
the budget connection are tested: 
 
(i.1)  Firstly, whether the government conditions the efforts made by the tax 
administration according to the “health” of public finances. That is, faced with a 
negative (positive) shock in public finances, does the tax administration – induced 
somehow by the political power - react by increasing (or reducing) its efforts in 
collecting taxes? Note that the negative (positive) shock could be due to a demand 
of citizens in favour of a higher (lower) level of public goods8 or, alternatively, to a 
decrease (increase) in the level of tax bases, maintaining the statutory tax rates, or 
                                                          
7 For example, this approach has also been followed by Grossman et al. (1999) in estimating the 
efficiency of US local government in "producing" local property value, and also employs the 
methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli. Thus, the authors state that "... such deviations from 
the maximum value are affected by local governance decisions; these in turn are affected by 
observable characteristics regarding the level of competition faced by the city and its 
policymakers" (p. 281). In our case, the “deviations from the maximum value” correspond to S, 
while those "observable characteristics" are precisely those included as explanatory variables of S. 
 
8 See Dušek (2002), who very appropriately calls this effect a "demand effect" in the process of tax 
revenue collection, different from a "technological shock" in the process of generating revenue, or 
from a "political effect". 
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to a reduction (increase) of the latter as established in the annual budget, 
maintaining the level of tax bases9, or to a combination of all these causes. This 
hypothesis is tested by using the (expected) public deficit at the beginning of the 
fiscal year as an explanatory variable, and so it is not possible to discern the 
cause(s) that has (or have) provoked the financial needs (or surplus). 
 
(i.2)  Secondly, the efforts of the tax administration may be affected not only by the 
“health” of public finances, but also by the composition of the public budget. Thus, 
we test whether the relative importance of the amount of unconditional grants 
received by a region from central government provokes an “income effect” that 
lowers the marginal value of any additional tax revenue collected, to the extent that 
there is no benefit in the tax administration making additional (costly) efforts (see 
Jha et al., 1999, for India; and Baretti et al., 2002, for Germany, who also found a 
"substitution effect" that, in addition to the “income effect”, disincentivises the 
efforts in tax administration).   
 
(ii) Electoral competition. It is usually believed that tighter races for political office force 
the incumbent to be more responsive to constituency needs, due to the higher risk of 
political defeat10. Thus, as long as voters dislike the burden of taxes, the political power - 
through the tax administration - will be induced, in order to minimise the risk of defeat in 
an electoral district (plurality system) or of losing/winning a parliamentary seat assigned to 
a district (proportional system), to reduce the efforts in collecting taxes in those districts 
where political competition is stronger. Therefore, the key question in testing this 
hypothesis is how to measure “electoral competition”11. All the measures proposed in the 
literature are based on the assumption that political parties look at past electoral results to 
get an idea of how tight the next election contest will be (see fn. 10). However, it is self-
evident that the way of measuring “electoral competition” depends on the electoral system.  
In Spain, the selection of regional representatives in the lower house is done according to a 
                                                          
9 See Toma and Toma (1986). 
 
10 Among many others, see on this issue Holbrook and van Dunk (1993), Besley and Case (2002), 
and the references cited therein. In the first case, the authors offer a review of the main index used 
to measure “electoral competition”. 
 
11 Besley and Case (2002), p.23, recognise that "there is no unanimously agreed method of 
measuring this ["electoral competition"]". 
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proportional system, in which Hondt’s law is used to transform provincial votes into seats 
in the regional assembly12. Hence, in order to measure political competition in an electoral 
district, the most natural way of doing so is to calculate the minimum number of votes the 
incumbent should lose (win) in order to lose (obtain) one additional seat in the regional 
parliament (see the Appendix for a description of this calculation). This is what we call 
“district competition”: the narrower the margin, the higher the electoral competition in that 
district. However, such a marginal loss (gain) will be relevant to the incumbent depending 
on her strength in the regional parliament. For example, if the margin to lose a seat in a 
certain electoral district is very small, but the government has a “comfortable” majority in 
the regional parliament, such a loss will be less important than when the seat is crucial to 
obtain a majority in parliament. This second factor is termed “parliamentary power”. On 
the whole, we propose to estimate “electoral competition” as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                        
Powerary Parliament* nCompetitio DistrictnCompetitio Electoral
−+
=        [3] 
 
Thus, the measure of “electoral competition” is a combination of two factors, which tend to 
vanish with each other. Later, in the empirical section, other measures of “electoral 
competition” are also tested, although they are all based on [3]. 
 
(iii) Partisan preferences. Given that the efforts in tax administration eventually influence 
the effective tax burden borne by citizens, it seems reasonable to assume that governments 
– as long as they are connected with the tax administration - will condition such efforts in 
order to determine the final weight of the public sector in the economy. As usual, if we 
distinguish between “leftist” and “rightist” governments, it is expected that the former tend 
to exert a relatively higher level of effort in tax administration, and so obtain a higher level 
of tax revenues (see Franzese, 2002, for a recent and complete review of the main theories 
and empirical results concerning the partisan motivations of governments).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 For an introduction to the Spanish electoral system, see Astorkia (1998). 
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3. Empirical methodology and data 
 
3.1. Empirical methodology 
 
The methodology used to estimate [2] is based on that of Battese and Coelli (1995)13. This 
methodology enables a stochastic frontier of tax revenue, i.e. the maximum amount of tax 
revenues that could be collected given, in our case, the (marginal) statutory tax rate, t, the 
tax capacity, B, and the administrative inputs, I, to be estimated. The error term obtained 
from this estimation is decomposed into two parts, the error term of the econometric 
specification, and what is known as the (technical) inefficiency effect: thus, the technical 
inefficiency is the difference between the observation of a decision unit and the frontier. 
Crucially, in our case, the “inefficiency effect” is directly related to S, as has been shown 
in section 2.1, and so it is explained according to the hypothesis set up in section 2.214.   
 
The estimated frontier is stochastic, as a decision unit is allowed to be below the frontier 
due either to a random shock or an error of measurement. However, deterministic 
techniques do not enable these two components to be distinguished, so biased measures of 
technical efficiency are usually obtained. Battese and Coelli’s methodology is able to 
overcome the inconsistency that arises when one tries to explain inefficiency through two-
step estimation methods (Kumbhakar et al., 1991; and Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991, 
were the first to detect this inconsistency).  
 
Briefly, Battese and Coelli’s (1995) methodology proposes to estimate the following 
function for a panel of data15: 
 
                                                          
13 See also Coelli et al. (1997). 
 
14 In fact, although throughout the paper we do not distinguish between tax evasion and technical 
efficiency, the two measures are not completely identical. This is because technical efficiency 
measures the relative performance of tax administrations in closing the gap between the maximum 
amount of tax revenue that could be collected and the tax revenue collected, given a level of tax 
capacity, administrative inputs and statutory tax parameters. Therefore, it may be the case that all 
(comparable) tax administrations were performing equally badly, and their levels of efficiency 
were close to 1. In conclusion, other measures should be employed in order to obtain the absolute 
levels of tax evasion (see for such measures, e.g., Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000, pp. 21-23). 
 
15 The joint estimation of the stochastic tax revenue frontier and the explanatory equation of the 
inefficiency effects is performed using FRONTIER V. 4.1 software, Coelli (1996). 
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( )itititit UVxexpT −+= β                        [4]  
 
where itT  is the amount of tax revenue collected by the tax administration i in the period t; 
 
itx is a vector of (k*1) values of inputs (in our case, tax capacity and administrative inputs, 
and the statutory tax rate) and other explanatory variables associated to the unit i in the 
period t; 
 
β is a vector of (k*1) unknown values to be estimated; 
 
itV are assumed to be identically- and independently-distributed stochastic errors, with a 
normal distribution of zero average and an unknown variance, Vσ ;  
 
itU are non-negative random variables, associated with technical inefficiency, and are 
assumed to be independently distributed, such that itU is obtained by truncation (at zero) of 
the normal distribution with mean δitz , and variance, 2σ ; 
 
itz  is a vector of (1*m) explanatory variables associated with the inefficiency of the 
decision unit over time, among which those variables identified in section 2.2. as 
potentially explaining the efforts made in the collection of taxes are included;  
 
and, finally, δ is a vector of (1*m) unknown coefficients, to be estimated. 
 
Therefore, from the previous assumptions, technical inefficiency can be specified in the 
following way: 
 
ititit WzU += δ                                 [5]  
 
where the random variable itW is defined by truncation of the normal distribution, 
),(N 20 σ , at δitz− , that is, δitit zW −≥ . 
 
By means of the definition of γ  (Battese and Corra, 1977), such that )( vuu 222 σσσγ +=  
 12 
 
 
and 10 ≤≤ γ , it is possible to discern the relative importance of the inefficiency effects 
versus the estimation error of the stochastic frontier. Hence, if 0=γ  the observed 
deviations from the frontier are exclusively due to an error of estimation, and the 
explanatory variables included in the inefficiency effects model should be included in the 
estimation of the stochastic frontier; therefore, a traditional panel data analysis is the most 
adequate econometric technique, not a stochastic frontier model16.    
 
In the estimation of the stochastic frontier a set of fixed and time effects are also included. 
The fixed effects aim to pick up certain structural factors concerning the tax capacity of a 
decision unit, or institutional factors that condition the composition of the administrative 
inputs, I17. As long as such structural or institutional factors are correlated with I, the 
exclusion of the fixed effects will produce inconsistent measures of the s'β (Mundlak, 
1961). The time effects have been included to control for common changes in the statutory 
tax rates over the period of analysis since, as has been already been pointed out, there were 
no differences among the CA’s with respect to the setting of statutory tax rates during this 
period. The time effects also control for the existence of common macroeconomic shocks 
that may have affected the tax capacity of all the decision units, and which have not been 
precisely captured by the variables being used to measure tax capacity.  
 
In order to control for the effect of statutory tax rates on the decision to evade taxes and on 
the efforts made by the tax administration (see section 2.1),  a set of time effects was also 
included in the equation of the "inefficiency effects model". Moreover, given that one 
potentially explanatory variable for technical inefficiency is the (expected) public deficit 
(see section 2.2., point (i.1)), the time effects may also help to alleviate the likely 
endogeneity of this variable. Public deficit was not used as an explanatory variable, since 
the simultaneous relationship is obvious: ceteris paribus, the greater the inefficiency, the 
greater the public deficit, while it is precisely the reverse causality which we want to test. 
However, having instead included the expected public deficit, there could still be a 
                                                          
16 The value of γ is obtained through the resolution of an iterative process, like the one generated 
by the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm. Thus, given an initial value (where, with the exception 
of 0β  and σ , the estimates by OLS of β are employed), the iteration process is solved for that 
value of γ  which maximises the likelihood function (Coelli, 1996, pp. 11-12). 
 
17 Usually, in the literature on the estimation of technical efficiency, the fixed effects are also 
interpreted as a "management index". 
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simultaneous relationship if budgetary decisions and decisions about the efforts of the tax 
administration are simultaneously adopted - which can be rejected if we assume that 
expectation about the public deficit has been previously taken to the decision over the 
effort in collecting tax revenue - or if both decisions are affected by the economic cycle 
(i.e., the expected deficit is negatively affected by the downturn phase of the economic 
cycle, although it might also be more difficult to collect tax revenue at that moment; see, 
for a possible justification of this argument, Andreoni, 1992). Especially with respect to 
this latter situation, the inclusion of time effects becomes a useful instrument for 
controlling this potential source of simultaneity bias.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the structure of the stochastic frontier used here is 
similar to that of Hunter and Nelson (1996). They only include administrative inputs 
(personnel and capital stock) and consider the tax revenue collected from the audit 
processes as the only output of a tax administration. However, having chosen that input 
would, in our case, have made it difficult to evaluate the relative efficiency of each 
decision unit unless we had very accurately controlled for the voluntary compliance of 
taxpayers. Failure to do so could have meant that a decision unit obtained no flow of 
revenue from the tax audit processes, and in consequence was negatively evaluated in 
terms of technical efficiency, while voluntary compliance was close to 100%. This, among 
other reasons, is why total revenue collected was chosen as the input of the tax 
administration. 
 
3.2. Data 
 
Most of the data employed in the analysis have been obtained from the information that 
appears annually in the Spanish National Budget (Presupuestos Generales del Estado, 
PGE) as an appendix, under the title "Report on the cession of taxes to the CA’s". The 
production of these reports is mandatory under Act 14/1996, 30th December, which 
regulates the cession of taxes from central government to the CA’s18. In particular, the 
information obtained from such reports was as follows: 
 
                                                          
18 The taxes administered by the CA’s are known as "ceded" as they originally belong to central 
government, but were then ceded to the CA’s (the first cession occurred in 1982, for Catalonia). 
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• Tax revenue collected from the taxes administered by each CA: Net Wealth Tax; Wealth 
Transmission Tax (intervivos and mortis causa); a tax on certain business operations 
("Impuesto sobre Transmisiones Patrimoniales y Actos Jurídicos Documentados"); and 
taxes on gambling (except in the Balearic Islands and Cantabria, to whom such 
competence has not been transferred19). During the period of analysis, these taxes 
represented slightly less than 15% of all the budgetary revenues of the CA’s. Table 1 
shows the relative importance of each one of these taxes for the fiscal year 1998. The 
amount of collected tax revenue corresponds to effective collected tax revenue, not 
provisional or forecasted, and includes both the revenue collected through the CA’s own 
offices ("oficinas gestoras") and through offices that do not directly depend on each CA 
("oficinas liquidadoras"). From now on, we will call this latter type of office "external 
offices". 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
• Inputs of the Tax Administration: number of personnel (tax inspectors and other staff); 
stock of computers; and m2 of offices exclusively given over to the tasks of tax 
administration. 
 
• Explanatory variables of the inefficiency of the Tax Administration: percentage of returns 
submitted through the "external offices"; and, secondly, concentration of tax bases 
(calculated as the total amount of collected tax revenue divided by the total number of tax 
returns, excluding taxes on gambling). In the former, this variable was included in order to 
control for this institutional factor which might affect the level of efficiency, without any 
previous idea about its sign. In any case, there is a suggestion that the high turnover of 
managers in these "external offices" and their low incentives to collect tax revenue might 
cause some inefficiency in the process of tax collection. In the latter, it would be expected 
that the greater the concentration of tax bases, the greater the level of efficiency, due to the 
greater profitability by tax return. 
 
The reports are published with a delay of two years: for instance, the budget for the year 
2000 contained the report for the fiscal year 1998. The reports used to construct our 
                                                          
19 Therefore, this is a typical institutional factor that must be controlled for by the fixed effects. 
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database correspond to the years 2000 (1998), 1999 (1997), 1998 (1996), 1997 (1995) and 
1994 (1992). Thus, the analysis consists of 225 observations (45 provinces were included 
in the database, while Madrid was excluded from the analysis as it has only very recently 
started to administer its ceded taxes, and still does not administer the Net Wealth Tax). 
 
The remaining variables were obtained from the following statistical sources: 
 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Capitalisation of the Returns of Capital (W): from 
National Income of Spain and its Provincial Distribution (Volume II), BBV, for all the 
years. As there are no official statistics about the wealth of a region/province (apart from 
real state property, what is known as the "valor catastral" (VC), which is measured by a 
National Agency), an approximation to the wealth of each province was calculated by 
capitalising the provincial returns on capital according to the national interest rate of the 
corresponding year (source: Bank of Spain). 
 
• Amount of unconditional transfers received by the CA as a percentage of total 
expenditure: this amount of funds consists of a share in the total amount of national tax 
revenue based on expenditure needs ("Participación en los Impuestos del Estado", PIE), 
and a territorial share in personal income tax (since 1995), both of these being sources of 
tax revenue collected by central government. This information was obtained from the 
Informe Económico-Financiero de las Administraciones Territoriales (a report produced 
by the Ministry of Public Administration), for several years.  
 
• Public deficit: the public deficit was calculated as a percentage of the regional GDP, and 
is the expected deficit that appears in the regional budget at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. This information was also obtained from the Informe Económico-Financiero de las 
Administraciones Territoriales, op. cit. Note that both this variable and the amount of 
unconditional transfers are common to all the provinces of a region. 
 
• Political variables: using the Anuario de El País, for several years, we differentiated - by 
means of a dummy variable - between regional leftist governments (=1) and rightist ones 
(=0); all the data necessary to construct the variable “electoral competition” were also 
obtained from this source (see Appendix).  
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All the monetary magnitudes were transformed into constant prices of the year 1995 using 
the national consumer price index (source: National Institute of Statistics, INE). Table 2 
provides some descriptive statistics of all the data. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
In addition to the political variables described in section 2.2., which aim to explain E, the 
following variables were also included: the GDP p.c. to control for its supposedly positive 
relationship with S according to the traditional theoretical models of tax evasion (see 
section 2.1), the "concentration of tax bases", the percentage of tax returns submitted 
through the "external offices", and the time effects. According to the literature cited in 
section 2.1, some "socio-economic variables" could also have been included. However, 
given that the ceded taxes do not affect all citizens (e.g., the transmission of wealth is 
clearly a non-periodical tax, while wealth tax only affects very rich people), the inclusion 
of socio-economic variables (such as level of education or age) might have given a 
misleading picture of the group of taxpayers. Furthermore, other types of variable, such as 
the composition of the tax bases (e.g., percentage of the tax bases that are financial capital 
or real state property), are simply not available. In any case, we do not believe that the 
exclusion of these variables biases the estimates of the other variables, provided we do not 
expect a serious correlation between the variables included and those omitted. The paper 
by Jha et al. (1999) – which employs the same econometric technique - did not include this 
group of variables either. 
 
Before describing the empirical results, let us consider the equations to be empirically 
estimated:  
 
)uv(zF)VCln()Wln()GDPln(       
) StaffGeneralln()Inspectors Taxln()Computersln()Officesln()Tln(
itittiit7it6it5
ititititit
−++++++
++++=
βββ
ββββ 4321
                                [6] 
  
This is the equation of the stochastic frontier (equation [4]), where the endogenous variable 
is the amount of tax revenue collected by the province i in t, Tit. The first row includes the 
four administrative inputs, while the second shows the variables picking up tax capacity 
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(GDP, W and VC), the fixed and time effects, Fi and zt, respectively, itv , the estimation 
error and finally itu , the technical inefficiency. From this basic equation, the elasticities of 
the inputs are allowed to vary over time, and so an interaction between each explanatory 
variable and a time trend is included. 
 
The equation attempting to explain technical inefficiency (equation [5]) is as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ]
ittititit
itit8it7it6it5
ititititit
wzOffices) External(ion)Concentrat Base Tax(.c.GDPp   
LeftSeats%*)W(Votes)W(VotesSeats%*)L(Votes)L(Votes   
)TransfersTransfers()DefDef(u
++++++
++++++
++++=
0121110
9
2
43
2
21
αααα
ααααα
αααα
                                  [7] 
 
The first row includes the variables concerning the “budget connection”, that is, the 
(expected) public deficit in relation to the regional GDP and the amount of unconditional 
grants in relation to regional public expenditure. They were both introduced squared in 
order to test whether their relationship with technical inefficiency is non-linear. The second 
row contains the variables included in order to check the empirical relevance of the 
“electoral competition” hypothesis, and partisan preferences. Finally, the third row 
includes the GDP p.c., the tax base concentration, the percentage of tax returns 
administered by the “external offices”, a set of time effects, 0α is a constant and wit is the 
estimation error of the technical inefficiency effects20. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Basic results 
 
The results of the basic econometric estimations are reported in Table 3. The most 
complete specification is Model 3, which includes both administrative and tax capacity 
inputs – also interacted with a time trend - and all the potentially explanatory variables of 
                                                          
20 In equation [7] the endogenous variable is “technical inefficiency”, and so a positive (negative) 
estimate means that a positive variation in that particular variable increases (decreases) technical 
inefficiency. 
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the inefficiency effects. The estimates of Model 3 suggest that the only administrative 
input which positively contributes to increase the amount of collected tax revenue is the 
number of tax inspectors, although with a very low elasticity (1.5%). With respect to the 
inputs of tax capacity, those picking up the level of wealth (W and VC) are only significant 
when they are interacted with a time trend, while the impact of GDP is significant both 
with and without such interaction. In order to check the empirical relevance of other 
alternative specifications of the stochastic frontier, we tested, in Model 1, the hypothesis 
that the inclusion of the administrative inputs can be rejected; this hypothesis was not 
accepted. In Model 2, the significance of the interaction of all the inputs with a time trend 
was tested, and this was accepted (i.e., Model 3 is preferable to Model 2). Table 4 shows 
the generalized likelihood ratio tests carried out comparing Model 3 with Model 1 and with 
Model 2, and also tests the inclusion of the time and fixed effects in Model 3, which is 
accepted. Thus, the specification of the stochastic frontier in Model 3 seems to be robust to 
alternative specifications. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Thus, following the estimates obtained in Model 3, with respect to the inefficiency effects 
model, the percentage of tax returns administered in “external offices” clearly increases the 
inefficiency of the tax administration. As expected, the greater the concentration of tax 
revenue in fewer tax returns, the lower the level of inefficiency. It was also expected that a 
greater level of income p.c. (measured by the GDP) would imply a greater level of 
inefficiency, given the traditionally supposed positive relationship between income and tax 
evasion, although in Model 3 this estimate is not statistically different from zero. With 
respect to the political variables the estimates suggest a powerful connection between the 
public budget and the tax administration (all the estimates being significant): provided the 
relative importance of the unconditional grants in the regional budget is greater than 
31.71%, the efforts in tax administration tend to diminish; however, when the (expected) 
public deficit is greater than 1.55%, the efforts tend to increase.  
 
The alignment of the tax administration with the electoral concerns of the incumbent is less 
obvious, since whether or not the latter distorts the efforts of the former depends only on 
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the narrowness of the margin to lose a parliamentary seat -  though the importance of this 
influence decreases with the strength of the incumbent in the regional parliament 
(measured as the percentage of parliamentary seats). Hence, when the margin to lose a 
parliamentary seat has diminished in a certain electoral district (in the most recent electoral 
contest), the tax administration tends to diminish its efforts in collecting taxes in that 
district, although this disincentive disappears when the percentage of parliamentary seats 
held by the incumbent is greater than 52.50%. Curiously enough the impact of “electoral 
competition” on the efforts made by the tax administration does not hold with respect to 
the margin of winning a parliamentary seat21. Finally, there is also some evidence of 
partisan preferences (see Model 3), in the sense that leftist governments tend to exert a 
lower effort in tax administration22.  
 
In order to check the robustness of the results obtained from Model 3, some variables were 
omitted in Model 4 according to the generalized likelihood ratio test (see Table 4). In the 
inefficiency effects model, only the exclusion of the variable “Left” and of those variables 
related to the margin of winning a parliamentary seat were accepted, while none of the 
inputs included in the stochastic frontiers were excluded. In Model 4, not only the tax 
inspectors contribute to increase the amount of taxes collected, but also the general staff. 
Thus, the elasticity of all the staff is 11.10% (invariable over time). The elasticity of the 
capital stock of the tax administration in terms of square metres of offices is negative and 
also invariable over time (-5.20%), while the elasticity of the number of computers is not 
                                                          
21 Alternative definitions of “district competition” were tried, which were always rejected by the 
better performance of the one that appears in Table 3. For example, instead of including the margin 
for losing or winning a parliamentary seat in absolute values, this was included as a percentage, or 
the smaller of the margin for losing and the margin for winning a parliamentary seat was chosen. 
Finally, the possibility of an electoral cycle (assigning a dummy equal to one for the electoral year, 
or even trying it for the electoral year and the year before) was also tested, and this was interacted 
with the margin for losing and winning a parliamentary seat. However, these hypotheses were also 
rejected. 
 
22 In a preliminary version of a paper by Besley and Preston (2002), p. 16, they find that "labour 
parties" tend to collect a relatively lower percentage of tax revenues. Although one would expect 
the reverse, in our case this result might make sense if leftist governments have set up a more 
important level of administrative inputs that rightist ones. Thus, given that the productivity of those 
inputs is relatively low (see Model 3), our result would suggest that leftist governments have 
expanded too much the material and personal means given to their tax administrations. That is, 
their efforts are low given their level of infrastructure in tax administration. 
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statistically different from zero, although its inclusion in Model 4 cannot be rejected23. The 
elasticity of the inputs of tax capacity is (slightly) variable over time and, for example, for 
t=5 this elasticity is 110.40%.  
 
With respect to the variables included in the inefficiency effects model, the signs of the 
estimates do not vary from Model 3, and so the previous conclusions still apply. However, 
the thresholds of the political variables varied slightly. In Model 4, the percentage of 
parliamentary seats that eliminates the disincentives of the tax administration in the case 
that the margin to lose a parliamentary seat has narrowed in an electoral district is 53.27% 
(slightly greater than in Model 3). Now the (expected) level of public deficit has to be as 
high as 1.64% (during the period analysed, its average was 0.57%) in order to incite the tax 
administration to exert a higher level of effort, while the relative importance of the 
unconditional grants has to be greater than 40.84% (higher than in Model 3) in order for an 
“income effect” to disincentivise the efforts in collecting taxes.  
 
Finally, Table 5 shows the ranking of efficiency by province and year obtained from 
Model 4. The average of efficiency during the period analysed is 83.77%, though the level 
of efficiency tends to vary across it, reaching its maximum in 1992 (86.76%) and the 
minimum in 1998 (80.77%).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
4.2. Additional Results 
 
 In addition to the percentage of parliamentary seats, we also considered alternatives to the 
measurement of the incumbent’s parliamentary strength. The results – for just the 
inefficiency effects model - are shown in Table 6. Two alternatives in particular were tried: 
first, in Model 5 the parliamentary strength was measured through the difference between 
the number of seats held by the incumbent and the main opposition party (as a percentage, 
though the results do not differ very much if such a difference is measured in absolute 
values). Second, in Model 6, the parliamentary strength was picked up by a dummy 
variable, whose value is 1 in the case that the incumbent holds a majority in the regional 
                                                          
23 Cfr. Hunter and Nelson (1996), p. 112, who also find negative estimates of the variables included 
in the production frontier of the tax administration. 
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parliament (>50% of seats), and 0 otherwise. Table 6 shows how the main results obtained 
from Model 3 do not vary. That is, the tax administration only becomes an important 
electoral instrument for the incumbent as long as the margin of votes for losing a 
parliamentary seat in a certain electoral district has shrunk. Thus, for instance, if the 
incumbent holds a majority of seats (Model 6), such an effect almost completely vanishes 
(-0.067+0.072=0.005). However, it seems that parliamentary strength is not so accurately 
measured if we just consider the distance with respect to the main party in opposition, 
since in that case the estimates are only significant at the 10% level (see Model 5). In 
neither Model 5 nor Model 6 does the sign or the magnitude of the remaining estimates 
change substantially.  
 
In Model 7, the parliamentary strength of the incumbent is included without interaction. 
Although the variable has the expected sign – the greater the parliamentary strength, the 
more secure is the incumbent in power, and so the greater effort made in collecting taxes 
all over the region – it is not statistically different from zero, and its inclusion is rejected 
according to the generalized likelihood ratio test (see Table 7).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
Table 7 shows the tests carried out in order to check the empirical relevance of each of the 
alternative hypotheses regarding parliamentary strength. In the table, each of the 
alternative definitions of parliamentary strength described above is indicated by φ . 
Leaving aside Model 7 - since Model 3 is clearly preferable to it - the inclusion of all the 
variables relating to political competition is only rejected in Model 5.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has empirically analysed the behaviour of the Spanish regional tax 
administration. In particular, it has shown the close connection between the political power 
and the tax administration itself. Such a connection implies that the tax administration 
reacts to the budgetary situation of the regional government. In addition, however, the 
incumbent also takes advantage of the tax administration in order to gain electoral 
popularity in those electoral districts where the margin to lose a parliamentary seat is small 
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- although at a decreasing rate according to its strength in the regional parliament. The 
empirical relevance of both results has been shown from the estimation of a stochastic 
frontier tax revenue function following the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995) for panel data.  
 
As was stated in the introduction, the normative implication of each of these sources of 
connection is totally different. The question is whether it is possible to ascertain if the 
connection is, on the whole, efficiency-enhancing. The answer obviously depends on the 
individual characteristics of each regional government, though the particular analysis of the 
budgetary connection might offer some hints about its net impact. While the (expected) 
public deficit has to be as high as 1.64% of the regional GDP in order to produce an 
increase in the effort in tax revenue collection (the average for the period analysed is 
0.57%), provided the relative importance of the unconditional transfers in the regional 
budget is higher than 40.84% (the average for the period is 28.86%), the efforts diminish. 
Therefore, it seems that the impact of the budgetary connection in favour of a greater effort 
in tax collection tends to be modest, or even negative given the importance of the 
unconditional grant system, and so it probably does not compensate for the negative impact 
of the electoral motives. 
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Appendix: How electoral district competition was measured  
 
In order to explain how we calculated the “district competition”, there follows a brief 
explanation of the functioning of Hondt’s Law through an example that appears in Spanish 
Electoral Law. Thus, it is supposed that there have been 480,000 valid votes in an electoral 
district shared among 6 political parties (A: 168,000 votes; B: 104,000 votes; C: 72,000 
votes; D: 64,000 votes; E: 40,000 votes; and F: 32,000 votes). This electoral district has 
been assigned by law 8 seats in the regional parliament. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Seats
A 168,000 84,000 56,000 42,000 33,600 28,000 24,000 21,000 4 
B 104,000 52,000 34,666 26,000 20,800 17,333 14,857 13,000 2 
C 72,000 36,000 24,000 18,000 14,400 12,000 10,285 9,000 1 
D 64,000 32,000 21,333 16,000 12,800 10,666 9,142 8,000 1 
E 40,000 20,000 13,333 10,000 8,000 6,666 5,714 5,000 0 
F 32,000 16,000 10,666 8,000 6,400 5,333 4,571 4,000 0 
 
Given this information, the number of votes obtained by each political party is divided by 
1,2,3 and so on, up to a number equal to the number of parliamentary seats assigned to the 
electoral district (see the table above). The parliamentary seats are then distributed to the 
political parties which obtain the highest ratios in a decreasing way (i.e., the first 
parliamentary seat is assigned to party A (168,000), the next one to B (104,000), and so on, 
the last one being assigned to A (42,000)). 
 
Hence, in order to calculate the margin for losing a parliamentary seat in electoral district, 
L, for the governing party in the region (note that it might not be the same party as A, 
although in the example we assume that it is), we have to suppose how the number of votes 
is distributed among the other parties. We assume that the number of votes lost by the 
incumbent party is allocated to the other parties according to the percentage of votes 
obtained by each party in that electoral district. The same assumption is made in the case 
of winning a marginal parliamentary seat. In the example above, for each party in 
opposition, we set up an inequality, e.g., in the case of party B: 
 
3
000104
4
000168 L.L. Bα+<−  
 
where :Bα percentage of votes obtained by B among all the parties with the exception of 
A. Once all these inequalities are set up, we select the smallest one. Therefore, we obtain 
the following general formula: 
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MinL  ; where the subscript I indicates the incumbent in the region, 
and –1 the other parties, N being the number of parliamentary seats and V the number of 
votes. 
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Similarly, in the case of winning a marginal parliamentary seat in the electoral district, W, 
we obtain the following formula: 
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Table 1: Importance of the Ceded Taxes (1998) 
 % Ceded Taxes % Regional GDP 
Net Wealth Tax (IP) 9.915% 0.131% 
Wealth Transmission Tax (ISD) 13.632% 0.180% 
Tax on Business Operations (ITPAJD) 58.584% 0.773% 
Gambling Taxes 17.869% 0.236% 
Total 100% 1.32% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Stochastic Frontier 
Revenue Tax Collected (*106 ptas.) 15,852.78 26,377.49 1,231.37 201,486.02 
Offices (m2) 1,464.90 1,288.74 150 7,502 
Computers 39.86 32.88 0 210 
Tax Inspectors 4.93 2.83 0 25 
General Staff 56.013 36.121 13 234 
GDP (*103 ptas.) 1,490.16 2,184.75 151.73 1,3514.98 
VC (*103 ptas.) 1,699.93 2,017.84 224.75 14,501.39 
W (*103 ptas.) 2,787.20 1,562.22 754.23 9,483.93 
Inefficiency Effects 
% (Tax Returns in External Offices) 28.15 16.04 0.74 86.52 
Tax Base Concentration 102.74 29.53 59.80 257.05 
GDP p.c. 1,802,090 414,095 924,008 3,346,540 
% (Uncond. Transfers/ Expenditure) 28.86 8.59 10.12 69.97 
% (Deficit (E) / GDP) 0.57 0.53 0.002 2.38 
Leftist Government 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Votes (L) 12,650 10,286 155 45,902 
Votes (W) 11,942 11,720 142 57,343 
% Seats 45.43 5.71 32.50 54.15 
Majority 0.33 0.47 0 1 
∆Seats (Incumbent-Opposition) (%) 0.3284 0.1566 0.0625 0.6956 
 
Notes: Statistics based on pooled cross-sections for the 45 provinces during the period 1992, 1995-1998.
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        Table 3: Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue Collected by Province (1992, 1995-98) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln (Offices) -.- -0.019 
(-0.798) 
-0.045 
(-1.314) 
-0.052 
(-3.320)*** 
ln (Offices) -.- -.- 0.002 
(0.367) 
-0.001 
(-0.152) 
ln (General Staff) -.- -0.021 
(-0.498) 
0.056 
(1.047) 
0.100 
(3.259)*** 
ln (General Staff)*t -.- -.- 0.001 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.188) 
ln (Tax Inspectors) -.- 0.003 
(0.514) 
0.015 
(2.304)** 
0.011 
(1.687)* 
ln (Tax Inspectors)*t -.- -.- -0.001 
(-0.533) 
0.0003 
(0.221) 
ln (Computers) -.- 0.007 
(0.889) 
0.003 
(0.224) 
0.012 
(1.182) 
ln (Computers)*t -.- -.- -0.0005 
(-0.103) 
-0.006 
(-1.635) 
ln (W) -0.056 
(-0.393) 
0.207 
(1.566) 
-0.143 
(-1.153) 
-0.220 
(-2.905)*** 
ln (W)*t 0.036 
(1.686)* 
-.- 0.054 
(2.932)* ** 
0.070 
(7.313)*** 
ln (VC) 0.076 
(0.931) 
0.359 
(6.254)*** 
0.034 
(0.528) 
0.142 
(4.506)*** 
ln (VC)*t 0.044 
(2.646)*** 
-.- 0.043 
(2.904)*** 
0.022 
(3.272)*** 
ln (GDP) 1.142 
(7.049)*** 
0.573 
(3.940)*** 
1.275 
(10.124)*** 
1,207 
(14.694)*** 
ln (GDP)*t -0.085 
(-3.426)*** 
-.- -0.108 
(-4.823)*** 
-0.097 
(-8.751)*** 
FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
Inefficiency Effects 
Constant 0.416 
(3.599)*** 
0.386 
(3.129)*** 
0.530 
(3.083)*** 
0.757 
(5.694)*** 
External Offices 0.004 
(4.585)*** 
0.004 
(3.284)*** 
0.004 
(3.623)*** 
0.004 
(3.461)*** 
Tax Base Concentration -0.006 
(-9.292)*** 
-0.005 
(-5.379)*** 
-0.005 
(-4.424)*** 
-0.006 
(-8.761)*** 
GDP p.c. *106 0.177 
(4.787)*** 
0.188 
(3.953)*** 
0.077 
(1.337) 
0.068 
(1.603) 
% (Transfers/EXP)*102 -0.618 
(-1.347) 
-0.874 
(-1.648)* 
-1.110 
(-2.074)** 
-1.333 
(-2.590)*** 
% (Transfers/EXP)2*104 0.757 
(1.070) 
1.188 
(1.403) 
1.750 
(2.215)** 
1.632 
(1.980)** 
% (Deficit (E) / GDP) 0.168 
(1.929)* 
0.142 
(1.555) 
0.319 
(2.708)*** 
0.427 
(4.089)*** 
% (Deficit (E) / GDP) 2 -0.049 
(1.480) 
-0.064 
(-1.749)* 
-0.103 
(-2.052)** 
-0.130 
(-2.994)*** 
Left 0.025 
(0.654) 
-0.039 
(-0.791) 
0.091 
(1.852)* 
-.- 
Votes (L)*104 -0.185 
(-2.104)** 
-0.157 
(-1.600) 
-0.262 
(-2.188)** 
-0.228 
(-2.465)*** 
Votes (L)*%Seats*104 0.369 
(1.980)** 
0.302 
(1.488) 
0.499 
(2.012)** 
0.428 
(2.205)** 
Votes (W) 0.110 
(0.655) 
0.082 
(0.904) 
0.073 
(0.578) 
-.- 
Votes (W)* %Seats*104 -0.198 
(-1.156) 
-0.161 
(-0.772) 
-0.160 
(-0.562) 
-.- 
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
Log-likelihood 226.072 221.537 235.819 238.757 γ  0.7672 0.4643 0.9999 0.9999 
Average Efficiency  0.8502 0.8410 0.8273 0.8377 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) levels. 
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Table 4: Model selection (Generalized Likelihood Ratio Tests) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis (Ho) λ  2
950.χ  Decision  
(at 5% level)
Model 3 
H0: Fixed Effects=0 108.046 21.742 RH0 
H0: Time Effects=0  26.092 8.761 RH0 
H0: Fixed Effects= Time Effects=0 107.982 26.983 RH0 
Model 3 vs. Model 1 19.494 14.853 RH0 
Model 3 vs. Model 2 28.564 13.401 RH0 
Model 3 vs. Model 4 -5.876 7.045 AH0 
Model 4 
H0: γ = explanatory v. of inefficiency=0 115.371 23.069 RH0 
H0: Offices = Offices*t =0 27.314 5.318 RH0 
H0: Computers = Computers*t =0 12.532 5.318 RH0 
H0: Tax Inspectors = Tax Inspectors *t = General Staff = 
General Staff*t=0 
 
30.114 
 
8.761 
 
RH0 
H0: Time Effects=0 (inefficiency effects) 30.794 8.761 RH0 
H0: GDP p.c.=0 (inefficiency effects) 26.116 2.706 RH0 
H0: % (Uncond. Transfers/ Expenditure)=  
% (Uncond. Transfers/ Expenditure)2=0 
 
22.686 
 
5.318 
 
RH0 
H0: % (Deficit (E) / GDP)= % (Deficit (E) / GDP)2=0 14.428 5.318 RH0 
H0: Votes (L)= Votes (L)* %Seats =0 13.306 5.318 RH0 
 
Note:  λ: likelihood ratio test statistic, such that λ=-2{log[Likelihood(H1)]-log[Likelihood(H0)]}. It 
has an approximate chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent constraints. The asymptotic distribution of hypothesis tests involving a zero restriction 
on the parameter γ has a mixed chi-squared distribution, so the critical value for this test is taken 
from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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Table 5: Efficiency Ranking by Provinces 
1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Barcelona 0.9996 Barcelona 0.9984 Zamora 0.9977 Valladolid 0.9994 Cantabria 0.9990 
Girona 0.9990 Pontevedra 0.9982 La Rioja 0.9970 Barcelona 0.9979 Málaga 0.9962 
Zaragoza 0.9984 Las Palmas 0.9969 Valladolid 0.9951 Asturias 0.9978 Baleares 0.9943 
Pontevedra 0.9983 Málaga 0.9738 Pontevedra 0.9893 Málaga 0.9965 Alicante  0.9928 
La Rioja 0.9976 Asturias 0.9737 Salamanca 0.9665 Baleares 0.9892 Murcia 0.9581 
Asturias 0.9967 La Rioja 0.9647 Barcelona 0.9613 Albacete 0.9829 Valladolid 0.9467 
Cantabria 0.9961 Salamanca 0.9523 Albacete 0.9573 Segovia 0.9802 Almería 0.9326 
Málaga 0.9958 Albacete 0.9282 Soria 0.9573 Salamanca 0.9769 Barcelona 0.9311 
Salamanca 0.9933 Almería 0.9218 Almería 0.9344 Alicante  0.9757 Albacete 0.9267 
Las Palmas 0.9930 Girona 0.9114 Las Palmas 0.9333 Cantabria 0.9715 Soria 0.9097 
Albacete 0.9924 Alicante  0.9011 Málaga 0.9252 Las Palmas 0.9666 Segovia 0.9022 
La Coruña 0.9884 Valladolid 0.8995 Baleares 0.9157 Soria 0.9578 Girona 0.8955 
Segovia 0.9445 Baleares 0.8979 Cantabria 0.8903 Almería 0.9455 Asturias 0.8736 
Cuenca 0.9329 Zaragoza 0.8967 Asturias 0.8782 Zaragoza 0.9295 León 0.8689 
Tarragona 0.9296 Cantabria 0.8943 Murcia 0.8766 Murcia 0.9147 Las Palmas 0.8632 
Alicante  0.9272 La Coruña 0.8898 Girona 0.8739 Palencia 0.9067 Salamanca 0.8532 
Castellón 0.9208 Granada 0.8821 Palencia 0.8698 La Rioja 0.9018 La Rioja 0.8502 
Soria 0.9091 Burgos 0.8820 Lugo 0.8575 Pontevedra 0.8928 Palencia 0.8459 
Valladolid 0.8997 Soria 0.8813 Alicante  0.8528 Girona 0.8909 Pontevedra 0.8353 
Huesca 0.8877 Córdoba 0.8722 Córdoba 0.8527 Burgos 0.8898 Orense 0.8321 
Toledo 0.8839 Palencia 0.8698 León 0.8491 Córdoba 0.8852 Tarragona 0.8250 
Tenerife 0.8740 Segovia 0.8551 Zaragoza 0.8455 La Coruña 0.8751 Zamora 0.8041 
Murcia 0.8696 Lleida 0.8458 Granada 0.8430 Castellón 0.8550 Castellón 0.8030 
Granada 0.8675 Lugo 0.8422 La Coruña 0.8426 León 0.8503 Zaragoza 0.8002 
Almería 0.8660 Castellón 0.8377 Segovia 0.8328 Granada 0.8485 Lleida 0.7949 
Lleida 0.8636 Murcia 0.8294 Burgos 0.8227 Zamora 0.8316 Granada 0.7918 
Baleares 0.8554 Toledo 0.8081 Lleida 0.8006 Sevilla 0.8222 La Coruña 0.7789 
Burgos 0.8373 Sevilla 0.7980 Valencia 0.7716 Lugo 0.8112 Toledo 0.7783 
Zamora 0.8370 Huelva 0.7827 Castellón 0.7678 Toledo 0.8038 Cádiz 0.7594 
Huelva 0.8340 Huesca 0.7820 Badajoz 0.7637 Lleida 0.8038 Valencia 0.7566 
Cádiz 0.8268 Jaén 0.7808 Sevilla 0.7526 Tarragona 0.8037 Tenerife 0.7467 
Córdoba 0.8178 Cuenca 0.7804 Toledo 0.7495 Huelva 0.7999 Sevilla 0.7437 
Valencia 0.8157 Valencia 0.7755 Tarragona 0.7466 Valencia 0.7932 Lugo 0.7406 
Orense 0.8052 Tarragona 0.7707 Cádiz 0.7431 Tenerife 0.7865 Córdoba 0.7401 
Lugo 0.7980 Tenerife 0.7694 Ávila 0.7367 Badajoz 0.7827 Huelva 0.7260 
Palencia 0.7930 Cádiz 0.7672 Orense 0.7272 Cádiz 0.7812 Burgos 0.7188 
Ávila 0.7806 Badajoz 0.7652 Huesca 0.7259 Huesca 0.7694 Badajoz 0.7180 
Badajoz 0.7506 León 0.7621 Cuenca 0.7193 Jaén 0.7566 Ciudad Real 0.6944 
León 0.7468 Zamora 0.7583 Cáceres 0.7143 Cuenca 0.7434 Cuenca 0.6932 
Guadalajara 0.7405 Orense 0.7522 Huelva 0.7095 Cáceres 0.7270 Huesca 0.6759 
Ciudad Real 0.7186 Guadalajara 0.7288 Jaén 0.7060 Ávila 0.6911 Jaén 0.6666 
Jaén 0.7161 Cáceres 0.6954 Tenerife 0.6985 Ciudad Real 0.6831 Cáceres 0.6596 
Cáceres 0.7145 Ciudad Real 0.6832 Guadalajara 0.6611 Orense 0.6807 Ávila 0.6580 
Sevilla 0.6725 Ávila 0.6311 Ciudad Real 0.6143 Guadalajara 0.6494 Guadalajara 0.6273 
Teruel 0.4581 Teruel 0.4563 Teruel 0.4676 Teruel 0.4757 Teruel 0.4390 
Average 0.8676  0.8365  0.8243  0.8528  0.8077 
Standard deviation 0.1140  0.1061  0.1145  0.1146  0.1164 
Max.-Min. 2.1822  2.1880  2.1338  2.1008  2.2758 
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      Table 6: Inefficiency Effects Model: Alternative Hypothesis Concerning Electoral Competitiveness  
 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 0.530 
(3.083)*** 
0.645 
(3.554)*** 
0.555 
(3.318)*** 
1.020 
(2.570)*** 
External Offices 0.004 
(3.623)*** 
0.005 
(4.062)*** 
0.005 
(4.405)*** 
0.004 
(3.551)*** 
Tax Base Concentration -0,005 
(-4.424)*** 
-0.004 
(-4.080)*** 
-0.005 
(-5.853)*** 
-0.004 
(-4.124)*** 
GDP p.c. 0.077 
(1.337) 
0.028 
(0.467) 
0.099 
(1.770)* 
0.052 
(0.903) 
% (Transfers/EXP) -1.110 
(-2.074)** 
-1.300 
(-2.183)** 
-1.381 
(-2.648)*** 
-1.024 
(-1.894)* 
% (Transfers/EXP)2 1.750 
(2.215)** 
1.743 
(1.813)* 
1.830 
(2.154)** 
1.747 
(2.015)** 
% (Deficit (E) / GDP) 0.319 
(2.708)*** 
0.299 
(2.662)*** 
0.399 
(3.475)*** 
0.219 
(1.618) 
% (Deficit (E) / GDP) 2 -0.103 
(-2.052)** 
-0.092 
(-1.923)* 
-0.149 
(-3.067)*** 
-0.079 
(-1.405) 
Left 0.091 
(1.852)* 
0.043 
(0.880) 
0.113 
(2.093)** 
0.097 
(2.045)** 
% Seats*102 -.- -.- -.- -1.164 
(-1.443) 
Votes (L)*104 -0.262 
(-2.188)** 
-0.079 
(-1.945)* 
-0.067 
(-2.874)*** 
-0.422 
(-2.497)*** 
Votes (L)*%Seats*104 0.499 
(2.012)** 
-.- -.- 0.845 
(2.387)*** 
Votes (L)*∆Seats(Opp.)*104 -.- 0.140 
(1.801)* 
-.- -.- 
Votes (L)*Majority*104 -.- -.- 0.072 
(2.551)*** 
-.- 
Votes (W) 0.073 
(0.578) 
0.014 
(0.525) 
-0.002 
(-0.148) 
-0.091 
(-0.559) 
Votes (W)* %Seats*104 -0.160 
(-0.562) 
-.- -.- 0.219 
(0.593) 
Votes (W)*∆Seats(Opp.)*104 -.- -0.042 
(-0.544) 
-.- -.- 
Votes (W)*Majority*104 -.- -.- -0.040 
(-1.306) 
-.- 
TIME EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
Log-likelihood 235.819 230.579 236.853 232.380 γ  0.9999 0.9995 0.9999 0.9994 
Average Efficiency  0.8273 0.8385 0.8302 0.8268 
        Notes: See Table 3. 
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Table 7: Alternative Hypothesis of Parliamentary Strength (Generalized Likelihood-Ratio Tests) 
 
 Model 3 
(Log-likelihood 
value= 235,819) 
Model 5 
(Log-likelihood 
value=232,676) 
Model 6 
(Log-likelihood 
value=236,853) 
Model 7 
(Log-likelihood 
value=232,380)
Votes (L)= Votes (L)*φ = 
 Votes (W)= Votes (W)*φ =0  
 
14.158*** 
 
3.678 
 
16.226*** 
 
3.820 
Votes (L)= Votes (L)*φ =0 15.244*** 6.430** 20.656*** 4.894 
Votes (W)= Votes (W)*φ =0 0.636 7.340** 3.086 -5.002 
Votes (L)*φ = Votes (W)*φ =0 17.690*** 7.210** 7.316** 12.176*** 
% Seats=0 -.- -.- -.- -6.878 
Notes: See Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
